





# **EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY**

### Generously hosted by Study Center Gerzensee

Supported by UniCredit & Universities Foundation

### PROGRAMME

### <u> Week 1</u>

### <u>Monday, 4 July</u>

### Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design I

08.30 – 09.30	Information and Market Power *Stephen Morris (Princeton University) With Dirk Bergemann (Yale and CEPR)
09.30 - 10.30	Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange *Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA) With Pavel Andreyanov (UCLA)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break

### **Evening Parallel Session**

20.30 - 21.30	Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms	Dynamic Adverse Selection with a Patient Seller
	*Hans Gersbach (ETH Zürich and CEPR) With Volker Britz (ETH Zürich)	*Marc Möller (University of Bern) With Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)

#### Tuesday, 5 July

#### Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design II

08.30 - 09.30	Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions	
	*Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)	
	With Carolina Manzano (Universitat Rovira i Virgili Tarragona)	

### Evening Parallel Session

20.30 - 21.30	Sophisticated Sincerity under	Selecting Applicants
	Incomplete Information	*Alexander Frankel (Booth, University
	*Andreas Kleiner (University of Bonn)	of Chicago)
	With Benny Moldovanu (University of	
	Bonn and CEPR)	

### Wednesday, 6 July

#### **Morning Session**

08.30 - 09.30Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision<br/>\*Margaret A Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR)<br/>With Florian Ederer (Yale) and Richard Holden (University of New South Wales

#### **Evening Parallel Session**

20.30 - 21.30	Dynamic Demand and Sequential Monopoly: A Model of Endogenous	A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with
	Screening	demand uncertainty and moral hazard
	*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of	*Roland Strausz (Humboldt University
	Texas at Austin and CEPR)	and CEPR)
	With Nikita Roketskiy (University College	
	London)	

### Thursday, 7 July

#### Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design III

08.30 – 09.30	Efficient Bilateral Trade *Marek Pycia (UCLA) With Rod Garratt (UCSB)
09.30 – 10.30	Social Learning and Information Design with Model Misspecification *Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) With Daniel Hauser (University of Pennsylvania)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break

#### **Evening Parallel Session**

20.30 - 21.30	Selection by Selection: The Case of University Admissions	Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms
	*Ian Jewitt (University of Oxford and CEPR) With Esteban Ortiz Ospina (Oxford)	*Alia Gizatulina (University of St Gallen)

#### Friday, 8 July

#### Focus Session on Developments in Mechanism Design IIII

08.30 - 09.30	Information Design	
	*Stephen Morris (Princeton University)	

#### **Morning Parallel Session**

10.00 - 11.00	Failure of Common Knowledge of	Selling to Advised Buyers
	Language in Common-Interest	*Anton Tsoy (EIEF)
	Communication Games	With Andrey Malenko (MIT)
	*Andreas Blume (University of Arizona)	

# <u>WEEK 2</u>

### Monday, 11 July

# Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective I

08.30 – 09.30	<b>Even Up: Maintaining Relationships</b> *Larry Samuelson (Yale) With Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University)
09.30 - 10.30	Bargaining with One-Sided Asymmetric Information and Nonstationary Behavioral Types *Ennio S Stacchetti (New York University) With Dilip Abreu (Princeton University) and David Pearce (New York University)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break

#### **Evening Parallel Sessions**

*Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin) So W	Incentives for Endogenous Types: Taxation under Learning-by-Doing *Miltiadis Makris (University of Southampton) With Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
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# Tuesday, 12 July

### Morning Session

08.30 – 09.30	<b>Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game</b> *Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin) With Ben Sperisen (Tulane University)

# **Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30	Private Learning and Exit Decisions in	Observation delays and cycles
	Collaboration	*Chantal Marlats (Université
	*Anne-Katrin Roesler (Northwestern	Panthéon-Assas, Paris II)
	University)	With Sidartha Gordon (Paris-Dauphine
	With Yingni Guo (Northwestern	University) and Lucie Ménager (Paris 2
	University)	University)

### Wednesday, 13 July

# Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Recruiting Talent	
	*Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (UCLA)	
	With Simon Board (UCLA) and Tomasz Sadzik (UCLA)	

### **Evening Parallel Sessions**

#### 20.30 – 21.30 Residual Deterrence \*Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn) With Daniel Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)

Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signaling Model \*Caroline Thomas (University of Texas at Austin)

# <u>Thursday, 14 July</u>

### Focus Session on Games and Contracts: A Dynamic Perspective II

08.30 - 09.30	<b>Bayesian Experimentation and Learning Treatment Sets</b> *Martin William Cripps (University College London)
09.30 – 10.30	Implementation in Dynamic Environments *Johannes Hörner (Yale and CEPR)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break

# **Evening Parallel Sessions**

20.30 - 21.30	<b>Optimal Adaptive Testing:</b>	Experimenting with Career Concerns
	Informativeness and Incentives	*Marina Halac (Columbia University,
	*Rahul Deb (University of Toronto)	University of Warwick and CEPR)
	With Colin Stewart (University of	With Ilan Kremer (The Hebrew
	Toronto)	University and University of Warwick)

### Friday, 15 July

### Morning Session

08.30 - 09.30	Optimal Sequential Decision with Limited Attention	
	*Konrad Mierendorff (University College London)	
	With Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)	

### **Morning Parallel Session**

10.00 - 11.00	Incentive Compatibility with Endogenous States	Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons
	*Suehyun Kwon (University College London)	*Piero Gottardi (EUI) With Sarah Auster (Bocconi University)

\* Indicates the presenter

#### ESSET 2016 Organisers:

Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR) Stephen Morris (Princeton University) Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR) Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR)

#### Standing Organising Committee:

Chair: Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR) Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR) Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR) Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR) Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR) Sven Rady (University of Bonn and CEPR) Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR) Lucy White (Harvard Business School and CEPR)